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ANTHROPOLOGICAL COSMOCHEMISTRY 
MICHAEL W. SCOTT 
Beyond Nature and Culture BY PHILIPPE DESCOLA 
 
‘[W]hy is a particular social fact, belief, or custom present in one place but not in 
another? ... Why is there no totemic royalty?  Why are nonhumans not represented 
in parliaments on the grounds of their particular qualities?  Why does an Inca or a 
Pharaoh not eat his enemies?  Why do Amerindian shamans not make sacrifices?’ 
(p. 391).  If, like me, you agree with Philippe Descola that these are the kinds of 
questions that ought to matter to anthropologists, then it may surprise you to learn 
that, like me, you are interested in the anthropology of ontology. 
In British anthropology at least, the concept of ontology has often been 
associated with Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and the self-denominated ‘ontological 
turn’ that his lectures at Cambridge inspired among students there in the late 1990s 
(now published; see, Viveiros de Castro 2012).1  Now, however, Descola’s Beyond 
Nature and Culture, translated at last from the French (Par-delà nature et culture, 
2005), reveals to the Anglophone world that there has long been a related but 
different anthropological approach to questions of being, one that even those hitherto 
sceptical of various appeals to the concept of ontology may find useful.  Descola’s 
project offers resources for an anthropology of ontology that is addressed to 
historical and ethnographic specifics, constitutively comparative, and 
unapologetically systematic rather than primarily reflexive and tending towards the 
prophetic.2 
* * * 
Descola’s main aim in this book is to identify and describe what he terms four 
‘modes of identification’ and six ‘modes of relations’.  The four modes of identification 
are animism, totemism, naturalism, and analogism.  These terms all have histories of 
                                            
1 For an analytical reading that constructs the anthropology of ontology as broader than the 
Cambridge-originated turn, see Scott 2014. 
 
2 I suspect, however, that Descola might say, ‘My work is not the anthropology of ontology; it’s just 
anthropology!’ 
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prior usage, of course, but Descola’s project is about giving them new analytical 
definitions.  As I will elaborate presently, Descola re-thinks these four -isms 
conjointly as four possible ways of identifying what kinds of things exist in the 
cosmos based on whether the ‘interiorities’ and ‘physicalities’ of humans and 
nonhumans are similar to or different from one another.  The six modes of relations 
are somewhat more self-explanatory.  They are: exchange, predation, gift, 
production, protection, and transmission.  These, according to Descola, are the six 
principal ways in which humans can establish connections with one another and with 
the nonhuman entities they encounter. 
Descola makes the bold claim that various combinations of these ten modes 
‘suffice to explain the principles underlying most known ontologies and cosmologies’ 
(p. 114).  He furthermore sets out to show how particular differences, both major and 
minor, among the various ‘known ontologies and cosmologies’ of the world may be 
accounted for as the effects of different modes of relations in compound with 
different modes of identification.  At the close of the work, he likens this project to 
chemistry.  By isolating these ten modes, he suggests, he has laid out a ‘table of 
those elements’ (p. 392) that make up the diverse ways in which people experience 
being in the world and their relations to others, human and nonhuman. 
In the form of an invitation to other anthropologists to employ his table of 
elements in future comparative studies, Descola extends this metaphor between 
anthropology and chemistry.  Anthropologists, he proposes, should look to chemistry 
as a source of inspiration for their theoretical and methodological models.  By this he 
seems to mean that anthropologists should theorize the lived universes we study in 
the same way that chemists theorize the stuff of the cosmos, namely as composed 
of a limited number of fundamental building blocks that bond in a limited variety of 
ways.  We should expect that unprecedented combinations of his ten modes may 
occur in extraordinary circumstances, and we should allow that new modes may 
even be generated.  But, contrary to ‘the apostles of creative action’ (p. 392), we 
should also accept that some combinations, however thinkable, will never be 
realized.  To this one might now add that, contrary to some voices in what has 
become the broader anthropology of ontology, the possibilities for becoming-other 
are not infinite. 
Apparently treating his modes of identification and modes of relations as two 
classes of elements that might bond with one another, Descola posits twenty-four 
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conceivable permutations.  This set of theoretical possibilities points to an agenda for 
what we might call an ‘anthropological cosmochemistry’.3  As will become evident, 
however, there are more than twenty-four conceivable permutations, because the 
modes of identification can bond with more than one relational mode at the same 
time.  In so doing, they form what could be characterized as the complex molecules 
that compose the actual ontology and cosmology prevalent in any given context.  
The science of mapping these molecular chains, these lived worlds – identifying, 
through logical as well as historical and ethnographic analyses, which ones are 
possible and under what conditions they may undergo transformation – is Descola’s 
vision for anthropology. 
* * * 
The first thing to appreciate about Descola’s cosmochemistry is that he does 
not offer the possible combinations of modes of identification and modes of relations 
simply as patterns of cultural meaning.  They are not just types of culture.  Rather, 
his argument is that, as observable cultural forms, they are expressions of certain 
acquired cognitive schemas that structure how we recognize humans and 
nonhumans and organize our behaviour towards them. 
Acquired cognitive schemas, as Descola explains in Chapter 4, are theoretical 
models developed to describe precisely those capacities that make the often non-
propositional forms of collective knowledge we call culture possible.  ‘They may be 
defined’, Descola tells us, ‘as psychic, sensorimotor and emotional dispositions that 
are internalized thanks to experience acquired in a given social environment’ (p. 
103).  They enable us to structure our perceptions, organize our actions, thoughts, 
and feelings according to relatively stereotyped scenarios, and interpret patterns of 
behaviour and events in terms of a shared framework. 
Cognitive psychology theorizes that we are all equipped to acquire a wide 
variety of such schemas, but we acquire some as dominant and others as subsidiary 
owing to our learning experiences and surroundings.  Anticipating later discussions 
of how his various modes may sometimes co-exist, Descola suggests how this 
comes about: ‘the schemas that should be held to be dominant are those activated in 
the greatest number of situations in the treatment of both humans and nonhumans 
                                            
3 The Oxford English Dictionary defines cosmochemistry as ‘the study of the chemical properties of 
the heavenly bodies and of the formation and distribution of elements and compounds in them and in 
the universe as a whole’. 
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and that subordinate other schemas to their own logic by stripping them of much of 
their original orientation’ (p. 105). 
Within the anthropology of ontology, Descola’s constructive engagement with 
cognitive theory is, in itself, unusual and is furthermore part of his distinctive neo-
structuralist and practice orientated approach to ontology.  Descola is clearly 
committed to a Lévi-Straussian search for the ‘structural frameworks that can 
account for the coherence and regularity of the diverse ways in which humans live 
and perceive their involvement in the world’ (p. 91).  Rejecting caricatures of 
structuralism as ‘icy objectivism’ (p. 91) that robs people of creative agency, he 
affirms the idea that the practices evident within human collectives are informed by 
unconscious rules leading to coherent and durable systems.  His turn to cognitivism 
is an effort to revise Lévi-Strauss’s Kantian notion of a ‘conceptual scheme’ and 
arrive at a scientifically grounded model of what mediates between structure and 
action. 
* * * 
Descola theorizes all ten of his modes as acquired cognitive schemas, but 
gives the modes of identification logical priority over the modes of relations.  The 
former are his starting points for imagining and mapping cosmochemical 
combinations.  But in order to specify the number and nature of these modes of 
identification, he must go beyond schema theory alone. 
Descola reasons that there are only so many ways in which one can 
schematize, or know non-reflectively, what kinds of things there are in one’s world.  
He speculates, therefore, that there are only a finite number of ‘elementary schemas’ 
(p. 98) that enable people to internalize particular shared ways of recognizing and 
responding to what they encounter.  Based on his own intuition, he suggests that 
these schema organize human experience around the criteria of whether the 
interiorities and physicalities of humans and nonhumans are similar or different, and 
that these criteria generate the four possible permutations he calls animism, 
totemism, naturalism, and analogism. 
Right away, Descola has his work cut out for him to clarify what he means by 
‘interiority’ and ‘physicality’ and to justify making them foundational to his four modes 
of identification.  In order to meet this challenge, he links back, via Edmund Husserl 
(1859-1938), to the grand tradition in philosophy of beginning with the self.  He relies 
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on his own experience to posit a mythical abstract subject ‘upstream’ from all the 
known or observable ways in which people categorize beings and things (p. 115). 
A quote from Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations serves as epigram to Part Two 
of the book, in which Descola develops this thought experiment:  
 
Whoever truly wishes to become a philosopher will, ‘for once in his life’, have 
to fall back on himself and, within himself, try to overturn all the sciences so 
far accepted and attempt to reconstruct them. (Husserl, quoted on p. 89) 
 
Falling back in this manner on what he describes as his own ‘resources’ – his 
‘intentionality’ and his ‘body’ – Descola asks the reader to accept the proposition that 
‘every human perceives himself or herself as a unit that is a mixture of interiority and 
physicality’ (p. 116).  He is quick to enlist the findings of linguistics and 
developmental psychology, however, to clarify that this premise of a universal dual-
aspect-self is not simply an ethnocentric universalization of Western mind/body 
dualism.  Rather, the sense of being two-in-one that he ascribes to the abstract 
subject is, he suggests, ‘an innate characteristic of human beings’ (p. 119).  It is 
furthermore what ‘modulates’ awareness of ‘others’ (p. 115), moving the abstract 
subject beyond mere awareness of others to comparison between self and others 
with respect to interiority and physicality. 
The four modes of identification flow from this scenario.  When confronted 
with an unknown other, the intrinsically dual self has four options.  If the self posits 
similarity of interiority but dissimilarity of physicality with the other, then that is the 
mode of identification Descola calls animism.  If the self posits similarity of interiority 
and similarity of physicality with the other within a limited group or class of beings, 
then that is totemism.4  If the self posits dissimilarity of interiority but similarity of 
physicality with the other, then that is naturalism.  But, if the self posits dissimilarity 
of interiority and dissimilarity of physicality with the other, then that is analogism.  In 
short, by falling back on himself, Descola seeks to overturn all previous 
                                            
4 Note that, whereas the other three modes pertain to all that exists, totemism, thus defined, refers 
only to the scale of each of a plurality of totemic units. 
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understandings of these four -isms, especially animism and totemism, in order to 
reconstruct them.5 
At this juncture, a brief note on Descola’s use of the term ‘ontology’ is in order.  
Descola refers to these four modes of identification, understood as schemas of 
practice, as ‘the four major types of ontology’ (p. 121).  He also refers to 
combinations of any mode of identification with one or more relational mode – such 
combinations being likewise schemas of practice – as ontologies.  He, therefore, 
additionally uses ontology, often in conjunction with ‘cosmology’, to refer to actual 
historical or contemporary expressions of these ontological schemas; ontologies in 
this latter sense are the lived forms through which the schemas ‘come to have a 
public existence’ (p. 247). 
I turn now to what I hope is a faithful yet analytical account of each of 
Descola’s four modes of identification.  Throughout the book, Descola strives to flesh 
out his model of four ontological schemas with ample illustrations from the lived 
ontologies documented in the historical and ethnographic record.6  In attempting to 
summarize and interpret some of his discussion and examples, my aim is, first, to 
explain the four modes, but also to restate and thus translate them using language 
now widely encountered in the broader anthropology of ontology.  In particular, I 
suggest ways in which each mode might coincide with concepts such as monism, 
dualism, pluralism, and relational nondualism.  To facilitate this task, I present the 
four modes in an order different from their order of presentation in the book. 
* * * 
Naturalism is Descola’s term for the mode of identification that has found its 
fullest and perhaps only expression as Modernity (i.e., in Europe and its cultural 
                                            
5 Later in the book Descola calls his general approach ‘relative universalism’.  He explains that, 
‘[r]elative universalism takes as its starting point…the relations of continuity and discontinuity, identity 
and difference, resemblance and dissimilarity that humans everywhere establish between existing 
beings, using the tools that they have inherited from their phylogenesis: a body, an intentionality, an 
aptitude for discerning differential gaps, an ability to weave with any human or nonhuman relations of 
attachment or antagonism, domination or dependence, exchange or appropriation, subjectivization or 
objectivization’ (p. 305). 
 
6 In 2010-11 Descola curated a major exhibition entitled ‘La Fabrique des images’ at the Musée du 
Quai Branly in Paris, which applied his theory of the four modes of identification to the analysis of 
figurative image making around the world.  The beautifully produced catalogue published to 
accompany the exhibition (Descola, ed. 2010), with its captivating illustrations and essays by Descola 
and other scholars, offers an important supplement to Beyond Nature and Culture as a visual entrée 
into the four modes. 
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outposts since roughly the seventeenth century).  Assuming that, like himself, his 
reader is a modern subject, he refers to this mode as ‘our ontology’ (p. 174).  We 
Moderns alone, he says, set humans apart from all other entities as uniquely 
endowed with a kind of interiority we have variously described as ‘immortal’ or 
‘rational’ soul, spirit, mind, or self-consciousness.  At some point in our recent 
history, we came furthermore to conceptualize this uniquely human interiority (and 
God) as immaterial and therefore empirically non-falsifiable; but this was clearly not 
always the case.  As Descola notes, even as late as the mid eighteenth century, the 
French philosopher Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1714-1780) thought in terms of 
human and animal souls that were two qualitatively different substances.  With 
respect to the extensive, tangible physicality of bodies, however, by the time of René 
Descartes (1596-1650), and certainly since Charles Darwin (1809-1882), we have 
assumed the ontological continuity of all things, both biotic and abiotic, as ordinary 
matter. 
This divide between all physicality on the one hand, and human interiority on 
the other, stands, according to Descola, behind the ‘great divide’ between the 
modern concepts of nature and culture (discussed in Chapter 3) and thus also 
behind the us/them divide between Moderns, as the only people who think of nature 
and culture as mutually exclusive spheres, and all other humans.  Indeed, all of 
these divides inscribe a major fault line between naturalism and Descola’s other 
three modes of identification.  By this reading, the nature/culture divide is not simply 
an analogue to body/soul (or mind) dualism; there could, after all, be body/soul 
dualisms that grant both terms to nonhumans.  Rather, the nature/culture divide is 
chiefly an expression of human exceptionalism, of the claim that nothing but unique 
human interiority – whatever that may be said to be – can produce culture. 
But, as Descola explores in Chapter 8, naturalism and its nature/culture divide 
are currently under significant pressure to transform.  In some quarters, the radical 
dualism between physicality and human interiority that some forms of biblical religion 
assert has gradually given way to forms of pure physicalism, or material monism.  
These deny the independent origin of human interiority and place it in continuity with 
other, less evolved, matter-based animal interiorities.  Still, it remains to be seen 
whether material monism will wholly encompass human interiority or keep chasing it 
and reinventing it as the elusive immaterial.  ‘[I]t seems’, Descola wryly observes, 
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‘that the mind can still look forward to a number of days of serenity before it unveils 
its physical nature completely’ (p. 191). 
* * * 
Animism, as ‘restored’ by Descola (Chapter 6), finds a great variety of 
expressions.  On the basis of comparative ethnography, and in dialogue especially 
with the work of Viveiros de Castro, Descola theorizes animism as the mode of 
identification that informs the lived ontologies and cosmologies of the primarily 
hunting peoples of South and North America, Siberia, and some parts of South-East 
Asia and Melanesia.  Using his own terminology, he reiterates what has often been 
said about people in these contexts: they ascribe continuity of interiority to a wide 
diversity of entities – including, sometimes, plants and phenomena such as the sun 
and the moon, as well as animals – despite the apparent discontinuity of their 
physicalities.  This common interiority is conceptualized indigenously, often in 
cosmogonic myths, as an original humanity that abides within many different forms 
as a shared subjectivity.  Animists assume that, like themselves, many nonhuman 
entities are persons, enjoying inner lives replete with self-consciousness, thought, 
language, and intentionality. 
Physicality, in contrast, is that which serves to introduce discontinuity into this 
otherwise excessive continuity of being.  Indigenously conceptualized as clothing or 
skins, particular kinds of bodies partition common human interiority, which is both 
antecedent to and different from humanity as a species.  But a body is more than a 
simple barrier against return to primordial lack of differentiation; it is also a distinctive 
set of ‘anatomical equipment’ (p. 136) that enables each kind of thing, in its own 
peculiar way, to grow, take nourishment, move, reproduce and generally subsist in a 
habitat. 
Curiously, however, it turns out that, according to animists, all beings who 
enjoy a human interiority also see themselves and others of their species as having 
a human physicality.  Thus, humanity is both a constant and a variable, a common 
interiority and a multi-form physicality.  Every physicality is human physicality, but 
with some distinguishing diacritical marking.  Unmarked interior humanity almost 
never appears, except perhaps in myth.  Jaguars are jaguar-humans; capybaras are 
capybara-humans.  Most importantly, humans are not simply images of unmarked 
interiority, but are better understood as human-humans.  That is, they exhibit a 
human physicality that is specifically marked as human, just as other forms of human 
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physicality are specifically marked as jaguar, capybara, and so on.  All bodies, 
therefore, are simply signature varieties of human physicality. 
This last point is crucial, as Descola explains, for understanding how non-
perspectival or ‘“standard” animism’ works (p. 140).  Descola argues that most 
animisms are not fully perspectival; most, that is to say, do not involve multiple 
incompatible points of view according to which, for example, peccaries see humans 
as jaguars but jaguars see humans as peccaries.  Most, instead, imply that all 
nonhumans see humans simply as humans.  But this does not mean that the human 
physicality nonhumans see when they see humans is the same human physicality 
they see in themselves.  Nonhumans see humans as human-humans, that is, as 
humans whose physicality is as marked and different from their own as the 
physicalities of other nonhumans. 
Human groups, moreover, elaborate this spectrum of human physicality 
among themselves.  They further mark their already marked human bodies by 
appropriating attributes from other physicalities – by donning fur, feathers, teeth, etc. 
– in order to appear to one another as compound physicalities: bear-human-humans, 
eagle-human-humans, jaguar-human-humans, etc. 
To risk an interpretation: all of this is to say that (contra Viveiros de Castro) 
animism, as reconstructed by Descola, is in most, if not all, contexts a monism of the 
human.  In ways that can be confusing to a modern naturalist, ethnographers of 
animist contexts have often described the human subjectivity animists impute to 
many nonhuman entities as ‘soul’ or ‘spiritual essence’ (see, for example, Descola’s 
discussion on pp. 130-131).  Such language can lead the modern naturalist reader to 
presume that this shared interiority is immaterial and thus ontologically antithetical to 
the bodies said to contain it.  But Descola’s animism is not a dualism of the 
immaterial versus the material.  The animist ‘soul’, or interior human, is material 
without being ‘matter’ as understood by us Moderns.  However subtle or light, 
however capable of evading the senses, it is nonetheless a ‘substance’ (p. 130).  
And this substance, Descola seems to be saying, is frequently all there is for 
animists, though they regard it as able to appear as many different forms. 
Of course, this is just one possible reading of Descola, and as I indicate 
below, there are ambiguities in his discussions of animist metamorphosis that may 
point to ambiguities within or among animisms themselves.  It may be that there are 
some animists who posit discontinuity between shared human interiority (as one kind 
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of substance) and the many malleable forms of physicality (as another kind of 
substance).  Although dualisms, these two-substance animisms would nevertheless 
be resistant to the nature/culture divide owing to the shared interiority of humans and 
nonhumans, all of whom would experience the same predicament of being in, but not 
of, a body. 
Viveiros de Castro (2007) insists on yet a third possible reading of animism, 
one that identifies it as a relational nondualism.  Relational nondualism differs both 
from monism and from any kind of radical dualism in that it subordinates all entities 
to the relations inherent within them and in which they inhere (see Scott 2013).  
Informed by the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, Viveiros de Castro has argued that 
animist humanity, also termed personhood, is an infinite fractal multiplicity interior to 
all its palpable forms as intrinsic self-difference.  This means, he emphasizes, that 
differences do not depend on actualized forms; all possible differences and relations 
are always already immanent to that which is called shared humanity.  Thus there is 
no original self-same form, not even the human, to which all others could ever return 
in identity of being. 
In contrast, Descola refers repeatedly to human interiority as ‘identical’ across 
all physicalities (e.g., p. 134, 135) and suggests that, without bodies, interiorities 
might return to a state of ‘excessive continuity’ in which they would be unable to 
enter into relations (e.g., pp. 131, 136).  This leads me to suppose that he 
understands most animisms to be monistic.  It furthermore guides my reading of his 
arguably confusing treatment of animist accounts of metamorphosis and the 
overtures of human shamans to nonhumans for trans-species communication. 
At points, Descola writes about metamorphosis – ‘a classic feature of many 
animist ontologies’ (p. 135) – as though it were a matter of one being ‘shedding’ its 
physicality in order to ‘reveal’ its human interiority to another (pp. 135, 286-287).  It is 
this language that seems to point to the possibility of interiority/physicality two-
substance dualism.  I would suggest, however, that, despite this language, Descola 
probably does not mean that metamorphosis normally involves the epiphany of 
unmarked interior humanity.  After all, if inter-species communication demanded the 
unveiling of unmarked humanity, this would have eschatological implications, 
according to Descola.  To avoid the anti-cosmogonic merging of interiorities, 
therefore, metamorphosis must involve re-arranging or adorning one’s physicality 
rather than simply shedding it. 
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Such techniques are ultimately mimetic; they involve attempting to mark one’s 
own physicality with the markings of another in order both to see that other 
physicality as human and to be seen as human by those who exhibit that physicality.  
A pig-human male who wishes to seduce a human-human female does not approach 
her with his unadorned interior humanity; he manipulates the elements of his pig-
physicality so as to appear to her as a particular kind of man (see p. 133).  The 
human shaman who wishes to communicate with ravens does not seek recognition 
as human by unveiling his interiority; he puts on a feather head-dress or cape in 
order to enter into a raven viewpoint that allows him to see raven-marked physicality 
as human and to be recognized by ravens as a raven-human himself.7  It could be 
said that such shifts in viewpoint reveal common humanity as the ground of their 
possibility, but they do not undo differentiation.  Given the unity of being as humanity 
in the animist mode of identification, bodies are necessary paradoxes: they are both 
excessively effective barriers and eminently malleable means to intersubjective 
relations. 
* * * 
Analogism, Descola tells us, is an extremely common mode of identification, 
being indexed in the ontologies and cosmologies of China, parts of inner and south 
Asia, Polynesia, West Africa, Mesoamerica, and the Andes.  It was also prevalent in 
Europe, he argues, in antiquity, the Middle Ages, and especially during the 
Renaissance.  Since then it has maintained ‘an underground existence’ (p. 205) in 
the great diversity of traditions often analytically collectivized under the rubric of 
Western esotericism and in such cultural appendices within naturalism as 
horoscopes, palmistry, New Age religions, and alternative medicines.  In all of these 
contexts, Descola suggests, complex systems of analogical correspondences among 
things arise from the presupposition that there is discontinuity of interiority and 
discontinuity of physicality, not only between humans and nonhumans, but across 
and within all entities in the cosmos. 
Over the course of the book, Descola’s account of naturalism as the mode of 
identification unique to Modernity transpires as an historical narrative of 
transformations leading up to it – a narrative in which, as just indicated, analogism 
                                            
7 Borrowing a concept from the visual arts, Descola (p. 138) suggests that animist metamorphosis is 
better understood as anamorphosis, the effect produced by an image (or, in this case, a being) that is 
so made as to be able to appear differently from different angles. 
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stands as a still evident prior phase.  His account of analogism, however, seems to 
imply an element of diachrony within expressions of this mode of identification 
themselves.  They seem to develop, as I will explain, from radical pluralisms into 
models of ontology that are fundamentally ambiguous, simultaneously construable 
as monistic, pluralistic, and relational. 
Descola’s analytical premise is that analogists experience the world as a 
chaos of isolates, ‘an infinite number of different things’ (p. 205), each with its own 
autonomous interiority and physicality.  For naturalist moderns, however, it is 
especially challenging to conceptualize the relationship between interiority and 
physicality at the level of any given entity in an analogistic system (see pp. 206-207).  
Interiority and physicality are neither two antithetical components, as in the 
mind/body dualism of classic naturalism, nor two aspects of one shared substance, 
as in the human monism of animism. 
Arguably, Descola’s discussion of analogism would be clearer if he avoided 
the language of ‘immaterial’ versus ‘material’ altogether (e.g., pp. 207, 211, 212, 
222).  The word ‘immaterial’, like ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’, can miscue the reader into 
conflating Descola’s analytical concepts of interiority and physicality with notions of 
the immaterial and the material as understood within naturalism.  Given his concern 
to divorce what he means by interiority and physicality from the mind/body dualism of 
naturalism, I have to conclude that when Descola employs the concept of the 
immaterial with reference to contexts where the naturalist ontology does not prevail, 
he intends merely to suggest substances that are ordinarily too subtle for detection 
by the senses (see also p. 116). 
As with animisms, with analogisms there is no such thing as the immaterial in 
the modern naturalist sense; everything appears to be a substance of one kind or in 
one state or another.  But, whereas with animisms, according to my reading of 
Descola, there is only one substance (humanity), with analogisms, there are many.  
Furthermore, every entity is a composite of different substances that either function 
or dysfunction in relation to one another.  In Descola’s words: 
 
The dominant feature…of any analogical system…is the grouping within every 
existing entity of a plurality of aspects the right coordination of which is 
believed to be necessary for the stabilization of that entity’s individual identity, 
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for the exercise of its faculties and dispositions, and for the development of a 
mode of being in conformity with its ‘nature’ (p. 212). 
 
The interiority of such composite entities is therefore de-centred, or multi-centred, 
distributed among a plurality of what one might term interiority-substances.  Hence 
the multiple ‘souls’ so often puzzled over in scholarly and ethnographic 
representations of analogistic contexts.  Aspects of interiority, and indeed of vitality, 
such as self-consciousness, volition, qualities of temperament, affects and passions, 
etc., simply are substances that combine with other kinds of substances to make up 
particular entities.  These latter kinds of substances are relatively, though often not 
entirely, inert on their own and might be termed physicality-substances.  All of these 
substances tend, furthermore, to be conceptualized as graded terms located 
somewhere between one or more, often hierarchically valued, sets of gendered 
oppositions: subtle versus dense, hot versus cold, active versus passive, dry versus 
wet, etc. 
An interesting aspect of Descola’s presentation of this mode of identification is 
his psychologization of it.  His language casts the ‘dizzying atomistic’ (p. 205) 
prospect of the profusion of entities as unbearable, inducing ‘obsessive’, 
‘increasingly manic’ (p. 202) attempts to discern links among things and reduce 
overwhelming multiplicity to manageable alignments, subsets, and patterns. 
Descola implies that a cosmos alive with innumerable heterogeneous and 
opaque intentionalities is too uncertain to tolerate.  In response to this uncertainty, he 
suggests, analogists seek to gain a modicum of practical control through a variety of 
synthesizing, classifying, and cross-referencing techniques.  On the basis of 
apparent or divined similarities and sympathies, they create elaborate taxonomies, 
bundling things together and then bundling those bundles into ever higher-order 
categories.8  Tending towards synecdochic self-similarity across all scales, the 
entities thus categorized and their substantive influences over one another drive the 
                                            
8 Descola makes the compelling observation that these processes of collectivization, which apply to 
social organization as well as the elaboration of taxonomies, may well have left their mark on British 
social anthropology owing to their intrinsic ‘functionalism’ (pp. 401-402).  He implies that social 
anthropologists trained in the United Kingdom identified among the peoples of Africa and India, to 
whom the British Empire gave them access, a primary concern to promote solidarity because such a 
concern was really primary for these analogists. 
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typical concerns of analogists: microcosm/macrocosm homologies and their 
medicinal uses, geomancy, astrology, computational divination. 
The more analogists bind things together, however, the more they undermine 
the compositional uniqueness and integrity of the entities they bring into relation.  
Different entities, such as a man and a particular animal, may be found to share a 
particular interiority-substance or ‘soul’.  An interiority-substance from one entity can 
invade another entity as ‘possession’ (p. 213).  And as analogistic cosmologies 
become more and more synecdochic, entities can lose their boundaries all together: 
‘their circumference is everywhere, their center nowhere’ (p. 299).  Entities become 
increasingly submerged by their intrinsic relations with everything else until, 
eventually, their intrinsic multiplicity becomes compositionally identical; ‘everything is 
in everything and vice versa’ (p. 300).  Note how this could be construed as a 
movement towards the relational nondualism of infinite fractal multiplicity Viveiros de 
Castro attributes to animism (cf. Viveiros de Castro 2007). 
Such changes are what I had in mind when I indicated that Descola imputes a 
diachronic dimension to this mode of identification.  It appears that an initial 
presumption of atomistic discontinuity and radical particularism reaches a point of 
development – perhaps only in some contexts and at an uncertain juncture in the 
process of analogical synthesis – into a presumption of either original wholeness or 
pre-relatedness that has been fractured.9  As Descola puts it, analogists weave 
‘heterogeneous elements into a web of meaningful affinities and attractions that 
gives the appearance of constituting a continuity’ (p. 202).  Beyond this turning point, 
myths and models that suggest either an underlying unity indicative of holistic 
monism (as in many Hindu texts), or an unoriginated flux of relations indicative of 
nondualism (as in many Buddhist texts), can come to inform the techniques devised 
to detect and manipulate influences and correspondences.  Once formulated, 
furthermore, these myths and models can obscure – both for analogists themselves 
and for those who study them – the atomistic premises that Descola’s 
unconventional approach to these cosmologies illuminates. 
                                            
9 Although Descola does not cite Michael Puett’s To Become a God: Cosmology, Sacrifice, and Self-
Divinization in Early China (2002), Puett’s innovative historical approach to Chinese cosmology could 
be read as offering striking support for Descola’s analysis of analogism.  Challenging received 
sinological representations of Chinese thinking as essentially correlative and indexical of monism, 
Puett traces a complex history of transformation from presumptions of discontinuity, evident in the 
Shang period, to highly debated assertions of continuity in the Han period. 
  
15 
 
The question arises, however, as to whether there are or ever have been 
analogisms that, as a result of their own efforts to embed entities in relations, have 
transformed themselves so completely that they now constitute a mode of 
identification not recognized in Descola’s set of four permutations.  It is striking, in 
fact, that Descola’s four modes of identification, graphed at intervals throughout the 
book with increasing elaboration as a grid in four quadrants, does not appear to 
cognize the possibility of continuity of interiority and continuity of physicality at the 
scale of an all-inclusive, or indeed, infinite cosmos.  In the only mode of identification 
with double continuity – totemism – this double continuity applies only within each 
totemic class and not across the totemic system as a whole.  Where then might we 
locate a truly cosmic double continuity on Descola’s grid? 
* * * 
Totemism, as reconstructed by Descola, is best exemplified in Aboriginal 
Australia, but it also features as what he terms a ‘minor mode’ (p. 171) in some 
predominantly animistic native North American contexts (the Algonquin-speaking 
peoples having given us the term).10  Descola acknowledges that totemism often 
involves a special relationship between a human collective and a nonhuman totem, 
and that it entails, as Lévi-Strauss theorized, a significant preoccupation with 
classification, but he maintains that totemism is primarily about neither the totem 
species themselves nor classification.  Totemism, he argues, is primarily a mode of 
identification – an ontology – according to which a plurality of discontinuous, 
independently arising ‘hybrid’ collectives, comprising both humans and nonhumans, 
each shares within itself both continuity of interiority and continuity of physicality.  
Descola refers to these isolates as ‘totemic classes’. 
One implication of Descola’s account of analogism may be that the 
cosmogonic myths of analogists are not always reliable indices of how analogism 
works; such myths often seem to present scenarios of original continuity in need of 
differentiation in ways that obscure rather than reveal the premises of double 
discontinuity Descola discerns in analogism.  This probably accounts for what some 
readers may find as his surprising lack of reference to cosmogony when analyzing 
analogism.  When analyzing totemism, however, Descola relies heavily on images of 
                                            
10 My own research among the Arosi of the island of Makira in Solomon Islands leads me to suggest 
that parts of Island Melanesia might exhibit versions of totemism as well.  Descola refers to totemic 
classes as ‘ontological races’ (p. 297), and I have theorized the poly-genetic model of humanity 
among Arosi as ‘poly-ontology’ (Scott 2007). 
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primordiality.  He seems to take cosmogonic myths that depict the unique origins of 
each totemic class as clear expressions of the premise of double continuity.  
‘Australian mythology’, he writes, 
 
evokes a process of parthenogenesis unfolding actually within the classes of 
hybrids already constituted.  When this process was complete, each of those 
classes of existing beings contained a vaster number of species, including 
varieties of humans who nevertheless remained in conformity with the 
essential and material particularities of the ontological types peculiar to the 
subdivision in which they had come to be. (p. 163) 
 
Owing to their common origin, all members of each totem class, both human and 
nonhuman, share a common physicality and a common interiority.  It quickly 
becomes evident in Descola’s discussion, however, that these two aspects cannot 
be disentangled from one another. 
Common physicality resides in a fundamental consubstantiality that makes 
itself manifest in all tokens of the totem type as shared somatic and behavioural 
properties, bodily capacities and proclivities correlated with qualities of temperament.  
The name of a totem group, Descola points out, is often not the name of its totem 
species but an abstract term meant to identify the group with its most salient overall 
disposition: ‘the watcher’, ‘the getter’, ‘malleable’, ‘gentle’ (p. 158).  The name 
denotes ‘a quality that identifies both the class and the emblematic (rather than 
eponymous) species that expresses its organic unity’ (p. 160). 
Common interiority seems to consist in much the same thing.  In fact, 
Descola’s description of totemic unity under the rubric of interiority simply adds to the 
picture of what this unity is by indicating how it is transmitted to each new 
generation.  During the primordial ‘Dreamtime’, Aborigines say, generative agents 
known as Dream-beings gave rise to particular totemic classes by means of their 
movements and metamorphoses throughout the land.  As part of these processes, 
each totemic class received a stock of souls, deposited at Dreaming sites in what 
became its territory.  Thus, each new token of a totemic type receives a soul derived 
from this stock.  Endowment with such a soul is a ‘guarantee of conformity to the 
eternal ontological paradigm that a Dream-being instituted in the past’ (p. 161).  Yet 
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it seems impossible to prioritize souls (as interiority) over corporeal qualities (as 
physicality) or vice versa; the two appear to be neither quite identical nor dissociable. 
Again, to hazard an interpretation: each totemic class appears to be a self-
contained relational nondualism.  Each is a hybrid entity composed completely of 
internal relations but presenting itself, paradoxically, as a unique autonomous whole 
free of all external relations with other such wholes.  The totem classes resemble, in 
other words, the discontinuous unique composite entities of analogism.  Descola 
seems to acknowledge this when he points out that, as a plurality of unique entities, 
the totemic classes confront the same problem of discontinuity found in the ‘initial 
state’ (p. 234) of analogism and must work to integrate themselves into a higher-
order system of relations.  A key difference between totemic classes and the entities 
of analogism may be, however, that whereas the latter come to contain everything 
only when the whole system has moved towards perfect synecdochic part-whole 
relations, the former always contain everything needed to make a world. 
Descola suggests that, given the internal continuity of each totemic class as a 
unique hybrid, ‘the problem that totemism faces’ is: 
 
how, without ambiguity, to pick out human from nonhuman individuals, given 
that they are all fused within a collective; how to separate out existing beings 
that are amalgamated into a hybrid class as a result of a mode of identification 
that minimizes discontinuities? (p. 295) 
 
But it seems, by Descola’s own account of things, that the Dream-beings have 
already accomplished the internal differentiation of each totemic class in the process 
of generating them. 
The Dream-beings, who were hybrids themselves from the beginning, 
disarticulated and distributed the various kinds of things intrinsic to their 
compositional being.  In their wanderings, they incorporated the land into their 
hybridity and became incorporated as the land, leaving traces of themselves in 
features such as water sources, rocks and hills, areas of vegetation, and the like.  In 
this way they not only made each totemic class into a distinctively emplaced entity, 
they also particularized places within each territory.  At some of these particularized 
Dreaming sites, they furthermore deposited pre-differentiated kinds of souls: plant, 
animal, and human souls for each totemic class in its land. 
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As Descola observes, the introduction of differentiation among humans within 
a totemic class is a finer point.  Being the ‘incarnation[s]’ of ‘ontologically identical’ (p. 
296) child-souls, the humans of a totemic class require some additional criterion of 
distinction.  Especially revealing is Descola’s discussion of how the Aranda of 
Central Australia solve this problem through their initiation rituals.  Each initiate 
receives the religious object known as a churinga, which individuates him or her as a 
particular segment of the journey of the Dream-being that generated his or her 
totemic class.  In order to capture how this mode of individuation works, Descola 
resorts to the concept of fractality.  He writes that ‘every churinga and therefore 
every human child-soul can be seen as a kind of fractal expression of the general 
structure of the properties of its totemic class, in that it illustrates a different stage in 
the conditions of its objectivization’ (p. 296). 
This raises the question, are the totemic classes and the Dream-beings from 
which they proceed best understood, not simply as self-contained relational 
nondualisms, but more specifically as bounded wholes composed of entities that are 
so thoroughly pre-related they all contain one another?  Are they internally self-
similar at every scale and infinitely divisible into parts that, by virtue of their own 
intrinsic relations to all the other parts, re-instantiate the whole? 
If the answer to these questions is yes, then the continuity of being that 
constitutes a totemic unity is not a monolithic identity but a saturation of delimited 
pre-relatedness.  Within such a paradoxically relational yet autonomous continuity, 
correspondences based on similarities do not need to be made, as in analogism; 
they manifest themselves in signs of intrinsic affinities within the class.  Corporeal 
particularities on a person’s skin, for example, such as birth-marks, moles, or beauty 
spots, may be said to correspond with markings that characterized a Dream-being 
progenitor; and these may further show how a person is linked to features in the 
landscape (see p. 293). 
In such a world, to be linked to something in this way is not a superficial 
association; it is to be, as an extension of one’s Dream-being, a disarticulated and 
distributed yet cohesively self-networked being.  This, I suggest, is precisely the kind 
of close relational continuity Descola is striving to capture when he describes a 
totemic class as one in which everything is ‘squeezed together in a complex and 
contradictory tissue of affects, interests, and obligations’ (p. 399, emphasis added).  
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Despite being a vision of ‘excessive proximity’ – of complete and therefore extremely 
tight intrinsic relations – it is also a vision of ‘ontological enclosure’ (p. 399). 
This model of totemic classes as internally self-replicating relational wholes 
may also help to account for the fact that continuity of interiority in totemism looks 
nothing like continuity of interiority in animism.  Relational continuity does not entail 
identical interiority.  In fact, it implies differences, not of kinds but of degrees.  In this 
respect, totemic classes resemble analogisms that have developed into perfectly 
synecdochic continuities; or, indeed, such analogisms look like one all-
encompassing totemic class.  Both are hierarchical chains of being in which 
continuity is not antithetical to inequality.  Some tokens of the totemic type appear to 
instantiate the whole more fully than others.  Thus, humans enjoy a marginal surplus 
of interiority over the nonhumans in their totemic classes.  This surplus appears to be 
a measure of agency or intentionality that enables humans alone to establish 
external procreative relations with other totemic classes.  There may be no totemic 
royalty, but human beings form an elite cohort of representatives who, on behalf of 
their respective categories, ‘declare themselves the principal emissaries of the 
Dream-beings’ (p. 298), aiding the latter in their apparent desire for relations with 
one another. 
* * * 
With the analytical isolation of these modes of identification, the first four 
elements in Descola’s cosmochemical table are in place. 
From the beginning, Descola grants that his efforts to describe what his four 
schemas look like as lived realities can make each of them seem like a static and 
free-standing ‘ideal type’ (p. xix).  But none of these four elements, I think he would 
agree, exists in a pure state.  The virtue of purifying them for scrutiny is to allow their 
internal consistencies to come into view as the properties that constitute the key 
differences among them.  This groundwork fills much of the book, and it is not until 
Part Five, ‘An Ecology of Relations’, that Descola begins the more complex 
cosmochemistry of exploring how these modes of identification combine with modes 
of relations.  These combinations, he seeks to show, not only account for differences 
among observable expressions of each mode of identification but also serve as the 
drivers of historical change. 
* * * 
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Descola divides his six relational modes into two groups of three: gift, 
predation, and exchange in one group; production, protection, and transmission in 
the other.  As with the modes of identification, but more implicitly, Descola theorizes 
the relational modes in terms of a hypothetical subject who enters into relations with 
some kind of other.  The distinction between the two sets of relational modes rests 
on whether this hypothetical subject regards the other party to the relation as equal 
‘on an ontological level’ (p. 310).  Thus, Descola defines gift, predation, and 
exchange as ‘reversible’ (p. 311) because they involve relations that are potentially 
two-way between the hypothetical subject and an equal.  He furthermore describes 
gift and predation as ‘asymmetrical’ (p. 311) because a return is possible but not 
normally expected; but the expectation of return renders exchange ‘symmetrical’ (p. 
311).  Production, protection, and transmission Descola defines as ‘univocal’ (p. 311) 
because they involve relations that are strictly one-way between the hypothetical 
subject and a party who is either hierarchically higher or lower.  These three all in 
some sense entail a dimension of domination. 
It will be immediately self-evident that the reversible relational modes are 
eminently compatible with the animist mode of identification on account of the human 
subjectivity animists accord to a wide variety of entities.  But this does not mean that 
all animisms exhibit all three of these relational modes in equal measure.  Drawing 
on the ethnography he knows best, in Chapter 14 Descola provides a detailed and 
fascinating comparative analysis of how three Amazonian groups, the Jivaro, the 
Tukanos, and the Campas, exhibit three very different animisms owing to the 
different relational modes that have become dominant among them. 
The Jivaro illustrate what predation looks like as a dominant relational mode 
and how it inflects animism.  Whereas virtually all animists engage in predation in the 
context of hunting animals, Jivaro relate to other human collectives as predator to 
prey.  They are notorious, Descola relates, for their constant wars, vendettas, wife 
and child stealing, and head-hunting. 
The Tukanos exemplify an exchange-based animism characterized by 
balanced give-and-take between humans and also between humans and 
nonhumans.  All important endeavours are governed by the strict observance of 
mutual obligations in pursuit of parity and amity. 
The Campas, whose neighbours treat them as prey, have rejected this 
predatory animism and elaborated gift-giving animism to a high degree among 
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themselves and their relevant nonhuman collectives.  Indeed, the dominance of the 
gift mode of relations among the Campas appears to have inflected their animism 
with a curiously Manichean dualism; their predatory neighbours and a host of evil 
spirits are banished to a periphery that is a distinct ontological domain. 
It becomes apparent that in the cosmochemical scheme of things, relational 
modes do not bond with modes of identification in a vacuum based solely on their 
own properties.  Different possible combinations are realized in contexts of 
contrastive relationship with one another.  As Descola puts it: ‘each [relational] 
schema constitutes an indeterminate ethical landscape, a style of mores that one 
learns to cherish and by which one differentiates oneself from one’s neighbors: a 
style of mores that colors one’s daily attachments to beings and things, with 
underlying nuances’ (p. 335). 
The univocal relational modes, for their part, bond more readily with those 
modes of identification that place different entities on different ontological levels.  
Thus, production is strongly in evidence in naturalism owing to its denial of interiority 
to all nonhumans.  The passive inertness ascribed to most things in naturalism 
renders them appropriable as raw materials at the disposal of humans, the only 
entities capable of agency.  At the same time, however, the reversible modes of 
relations are also found in naturalism where human interactions are concerned, and 
may come to differentiate kinds of humans.  In fact, Descola’s cosmochemical 
analysis of naturalism determines that, because of the gulf it imposes between 
humans and nonhumans, naturalism is unable to form a stable bond with any single 
dominant relational mode; instead, it forms only weak bonds with different relational 
modes in different situations.  Protection (seen in the domestication of animals or 
chains of patron-client relations) and transmission (of laws and traditions from elders 
to juniors, ancestors to descendants, or gods to humans) are the salient relational 
modes, Descola determines, in analogisms. 
It thus emerges that there are more possible cosmochemical bonds than the 
twenty-four permutations of each relational mode in simple combination with each 
mode of identification.  Each mode of identification is amenable to simultaneous 
combination with more than one relational mode, and it is the formation of these 
complex compounds that can lead to further cosmochemical reactions and 
transformations.  If, for some contingent reason, a subsidiary relational mode 
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becomes more important – attracts more atoms of its own element to the molecule, 
as it were – things can begin to change dramatically. 
 
Certain ways of treating ‘others’ that are present in a minor form in one mode 
of identification sometimes come to play a more predominant role that soon 
renders them incompatible with the ontological regime in which they have 
developed; and this makes it necessary to alter that ontological regime or 
transfer to another mode of identification that is better suited to a different way 
of treating others. (p. 366) 
 
To concretize these dynamics, Descola develops a hypothetical example.  
Normally, as he shows from Amerindian cases, protection is a minor relational mode 
among many animists, expressed in the occasional taming of individual orphaned or 
stray animals.  But, the generalization of personhood to many nonhumans makes 
animism resistant to large-scale domestication of food species.  Nevertheless, 
ethnographic accounts of the Chukchee of northeastern Siberia, who hunt wild 
reindeer but also tend small herds, suggest to Descola how an increased role for 
protection may move an animism towards analogism.  Small changes to a relational 
mode – to how one treats a certain set of others – can result eventually in changes 
to one’s mode of identification – to what kind of interiority and physicality one 
ascribes to that set of others and thus, potentially, to other sets of others with whom 
it may be associated. 
* * * 
With this elementary table of four modes of identification and six modes of 
relations, Descola addresses a range of highly particular questions and sheds 
considerable light on many of them.  Why have most Amerindians not taken up 
animal husbandry?  Why have the Chinese long practiced fengshui geomancy, while 
the Moderns have largely given up such practices?  Why are some Moderns 
powerfully drawn to such practices?  What is the difference between ‘the masters of 
the animals’ and ‘the spirits of the ancestors’?  By what logic can an Australian 
Aborigine say of a kangaroo that it is ‘just the same’ (p. 242) as himself?  But 
Descola clearly hopes that this is only the beginning.  There are many more such 
questions to be addressed and many highly idiosyncratic lived ontologies and 
cosmologies to be analyzed in terms of their cosmochemical composition.  Descola 
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offers his table of elements as a preliminary knowledge base, the explanatory power 
of which he has demonstrated impressively.  His anthropological cosmochemistry is 
a project that deserves to be examined, taken up, and tested. 
* * * 
A number of important contributions to the anthropology of ontology have led 
with the thesis that the nature/culture distinction is unique to Western Moderns and is 
an index of a mind/body dualism that has caused anthropologists to misapprehend 
non-Western others and struggle to account for their so-called irrational beliefs.  As 
indicated in the discussion of naturalism above, a version of this thesis, with its own 
particular nuances, is likewise central to Descola’s project, hence his title, Beyond 
Nature and Culture.  But Descola’s approach to the anthropology of ontology also 
gets us beyond this basic thesis about nature and culture in ways that other 
approaches do not. 
Too often in the anthropology of ontology, there is only one thing to be 
discovered about non-Westerners: they are not mind/body dualists and therefore do 
not separate nature and culture.  ‘Their’ ontology is not ‘our’ ontology, and 
awareness of this difference is supposed to illuminate everything about ‘them’ that 
‘we’ are inclined to regard as irrational.  This preoccupation with ‘us’/‘them’ alterity 
has tended to create a theoretical typology of only two great ontologies: Cartesian-
Kantian dualism and not-Cartesian-Kantian dualism.  Increasingly, moreover, diverse 
theoretical developments, all more or less informed by the philosophy of Deleuze, 
have converged to cast not-Cartesian-Kantian dualism as always and everywhere 
the limitless flux of relational nondualism (i.e., infinite fractal multiplicity in which 
everything contains everything) (Scott 2013a, 2013b). 
Some people may not be able to resist the impulse to reanalyze Descola’s 
animism, totemism, and analogism as all ultimately grounded in a default ontology of 
infinite fractal multiplicity.  Some may even seek to dissolve all four modes of 
identification into this default nondualism.  Just as Bruno Latour (1993) has argued 
that ‘we have never been modern’, they may wish to argue that animists have never 
been animists, totemists have never been totemists, and analogists have never been 
analogists; all these are just so many ways of distributing the default flux of 
nondualism.  Others – particularly those who understand animism itself to be infinite 
relational nondualism – may achieve the same end by calling them all animism of 
one kind or another. 
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In my view, however, the chief merit of Descola’s project is precisely its focus 
on precipitating consequential differences, differences on which an analytically 
imposed default ontology of infinite relational nondualism offers little or no traction.  
Even if one is not persuaded by Descola’s premise that his modes of identification 
are acquired cognitive schemas, or that their differences hinge primarily on how they 
distribute interiority and physicality, or even that there are only four possible 
elementary ontologies, nevertheless his approach begins to bring into relief how non-
Western ontologies differ from one another and how they do so in systematic ways.  
It helps to move the anthropology of ontology beyond nature and culture as the 
difference between Moderns and all others and onto the bigger challenge of 
recognizing and analyzing different differences.  To quote Descola out of context: 
‘For all those weary of an overuniform world, that…is surely cause for a measure of 
rejoicing’ (p. 143). 
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